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Maryland Law Review
VOLUME X

FALL 1949

STATE LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX

NUMBER 4

OF THE

By MARTIN ALAN MITNICK*

I.

THE PROBLEM AND THE FRAMEWORK

There exists today among the various states of this
country an appreciable variation in method of resolution
of the important problem of apportioning the federal estate
tax. So it is that the recipient of property included in the
gross estate of the decedent may find himself liable for an
amount ranging from all to none of the tax under certain
circumstances, depending upon the particular state possessed of jurisdiction.
The apparent cause of this situation is the existence,
side-by-side, of federal and state statutes governing the
apportionment of the federal estate tax. The federal statute
seemed to place the burden of payment upon the residuary
estate.' Property which was required to be included in the
gross estate, but which did not pass through the executor's
hands, was therefore likely to escape its share of the tax
burden.' The unfortunate nature of this situation was
pointed out in 1930, by the New York State Commission
to Report Defects in the Law of Estates in the finding that
"experience has demonstrated that in most estates, the
*Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., Johns Hopkins University, 1941; LL.B.,
University of Maryland, 1948; LL.M., Harvard University, 1949.
1 Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S.47 (1924).
'See Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N. H. 471,
200 A. 786 (1938) ; Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 A. 176 (1938) ;
Uber's Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C. 341 (1936); Central Trust Co. v. Burrow,
144 Kan. 79, 58 P. 2d 469 (1936) ; Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Winthrop,
238 N. Y. 488, 144 N. E. 769 (1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 633 (1925) ; Bemis
v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N. E. 686 (1923).
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residuary legatees are the widow, children or nearer and
more dependent relatives." 3
In partial remedy, Congress provided4 for apportionment against recipients of life insurance proceeds, and
later5 against those who received property passing under
certain powers of appointment.
Many of the states, including Maryland, have set up
their own statutes to govern the apportionment of the federal estate tax. While these differ in certain details, their
common theme is the supplemental attempt to effect an
equitable distribution of the tax burden.
Outwardly, the picture of varying methods of apportionment of the same tax would appear to be one of conflict. However, most of the doubts upon the subject of constitutionality have been resolved by the Supreme Court in
the case of Riggs v. Del Drago.s The Court found no violation of the supremacy and uniformity clauses of the Constitution,7 on the principal theory that the New York apportionment statute' did not interfere with the primary federal objective of collecting the tax. In an opinion written
by Mr. Justice Murphy, the Court held that it was the
intent of Congress as shown by legislative history that the
tax be paid "out of the estate as a whole",9 and that state
property law should determine the "ultimate impact of the
federal tax"."
The result of upholding the apportionment provisions
of the New York Decedent Estate Law, which in its principal features is typical of state apportionment laws, is to
leave the ultimate incidence of the federal estate tax to
the will of the testator or to the applicable state statute,
' Cited In the later-prevailing dissent to In Re Del Drago's Estate, 287
N. Y. 61, 83; 38 N. E. 2d 131,142 (1941).
'26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 826c.
826 U. S. C. A. Sec. 826d.
a317 U. S. 95 (1942).
'U. S. Const., Art. VI, el. 2; Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1.
N. Y. Decedent Estate Law, Sec. 124.
317
U. S. 95, 97 (1942).
"0 Ibid., 98. The California proration act has recently been upheld as to
validity under the California Constitution in a decision which found that
the act did not violate the requirement (among others) of uniformity of
taxation. In Re Welsh's Est., 89 A. C. A. 42, 200 P. 2d 139 (1949).
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if any there be." If neither of these be found, the federal
provisions will apply.
On the other hand, there is indication that state law
may apply even if there is no state apportionment statute,
if the executor does not choose to evoke the federal provisions."
It must be kept in mind throughout the reading of this
paper that the various state statutes stand in the midst of
the federal law applicable alike to a state which has an
apportionment statute and to a state which has none. While
the Del Drago case indicates that, if a state has a proration
statute, an executor may follow it without fear of violating
the federal law, it has not been held that the federal provisions for apportionment are superseded by such state
legislation. Moreover, many of the federal provisions such
as those which have to do with the executor's liability are
not usually duplicated by the states, and they must certainly be kept in mind.
The sections of the present federal statute which the
state provisions supplement or perhaps effectively displace
are Int. Rev. Code sections 826(c) and 826(d).1
Section 826(c) provides that, in the absence of testamentary direction to the contrary, the executor "shall be
entitled to recover" a pro rata share of the tax from the
beneficiary (other than the executor) of life insurance
policies.1 4 Section 826(d) provides similarly with respect
" This seems to have been the bidding of the Supreme Court in Edwards
v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61 (1924).
" See infra, at n. 29. It is interesting to note a ease in which the New
York Court of Appeals had passed a decree in 1942, failing to apportion
the federal tax, on the belief that such apportionment was void under the
case of In Re Del Drago's Estate, 287 N. Y. 61, 38 N. E. 2d 131 (1941) ;
motion for roarg. denied, 287 N. Y. 764, 40 N. E. 2d 46 (1942). Later the.
Del Drago case was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, Riggs
v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95 (1942). It was held by a New York Surrogate
that the earlier decree could not be reopened, as no timely appeal therefrom
had been taken. In re Humphrey's Estate, 182 Misc. 63, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 729
(1943).
18It should be remembered that the federal government could change
its statutory provisions in aid or hindrance of state action here treated.
1 See, for example of cases in which this section was availed of in states
having no apportionment statute at the time of the case, United States
Trust Co. v. Sears, 29 F. Supp. 643 (D. Conn. 1939) ; Priedman v. Jamison,
356 Mo. 627, 202 S. W. 2d 900 (1947).
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to recovery from a "person receiving . . . property by
reason of the exercise, nonexercise or release of a power
of appointment". Both sections are now made expressly
inapplicable by their terms to property included in the
marital deduction 5 to the extent thereof. Where both types
of property are included in the gross estate, the life insurance proceeds are first entitled to this exception to their
entire amount or to the amount of the allowable marital
deduction, whichever is the lower.'" It should be noted that
the words "shall be entitled to recover" have a permissive
sound, which would indicate that the executor, under the
federal act, need not prorate the tax. In the absence of contrary testamentary direction, it would seem that the executor could, aside from state legislation, charge the residue
of the estate with the entire federal estate tax. Furthermore, notice should be taken of the statement in the Regulations that sections 826 (c) and (d) do not limit "the right of
the Commissioner to collect the tax from any person, or out
of any property liable therefor", nor can the Commissioner
be required to apportion the tax. 7
Another important section of the Internal Revenue Code
is 822(b), which provides that the executor shall pay the
tax. According to the Regulations, the executor must pay
the tax on the whole estate, even though parts of the estate
do not pass through his hands. If the executor should fail
to pay the tax, the recipient of various property included
in the gross estate is personally liable as a transferee, and
126 U. S. C. A. Sec. 812 (e).
16See Sec. 365, Public Law 471, 80th Cong., c. 168, 2d Sess. (H. R. 4790),
"Revenue Act of 1948". It Is not yet clear as to whether or not state apportionment statutes as they now stand would reduce the amount included
within the marital deduction. Casner, in his recent Estate Planning Under
the Revenue Act of 1948, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 430 (1949), indicates that
state apportionment would reduce the marital deduction gifts by the
amount of the tax charged to them. On the other hand, it Is possible that
property included in the marital deduction could be accorded the game
treatment usually accorded to charitable bequests. See, infra, circa ns.
165-169. This latter view has been taken in the recent N. Y. case of
Estate of Harry T. Peters, CCH Inher. Est. and Gift Tax Rep., par. 16, 407.
11Regulations 105, Sec. 81.84. The fact that the Commissioner proceeded
against one or several of the transferees for collection of the entire tax
did not determine the proration of the tax burden under the Pennsylvania
proration act. In Re Mellon Estate, 347 Pa. 520, 531-2, 32 A. 2d 749, 755-6
(1943).
Regulations 105, Sec. 81.76.
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a lien attaches to such property under section 827(b).11
Note also the Commissioner's contention that if the executor makes whole or partial distribution, or pays any debt
of the decedent or of the estate, he is personally liable for
the unpaid tax to the extent of such payment or distribution.2"
Despite the contention to the contrary in the later overruled decision of Del Drago's Estate,2 the Supreme Court
of the United States recognizes that the right of control
of property succession at death is within the province of
the states.22 However, it is implicit in these cases that the
federal government may validly impose excise, transfer,
estate and succession taxes. This power, indeed, can be
regarded as amounting indirectly to a control of the right
of succession to property, both in destroying such right
to the extent of the tax and in effectively transferring the
enjoyment of such right by apportioning the burden of the
tax. It should be remembered, however, that the decedent
by will (and sometimes by direction in an inter vivos trust)
can direct apportionment otherwise than in the manner in
which it is set out in either federal or state statute.

II. THE PloBLEm SoLvED
States which have enacted legislation seeking to apportion the incidence of the federal estate tax are listed in
the following chart:
19See Francis A. Wilson, et al., Executors and Transferees of Est. of
Henry Wilson, 2 T. C. 1059 (1943). Transferee's liability for payment of
his share of the federal estate tax is not affected by his disposition of
such property. In Re Mellon Estate, supra, n. 17.
2,Regulations 105, Sec. 81.99. However, see 26 U. S. C. A., Sec. 825 (a)
for the manner in which an executor can apply for discharge from personal
liability for deficiency of the tax.
21287 N. Y. 61, 38 N. E. 2d 131 (1941) ; motion for rearg. denied, 287 N. Y.
764, 40 N. E. 2d 46 (1942).
* Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55 (1930) ; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U. S. 345 (1921) ; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900) ; see also Blair
v. Commissioner I. R., 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
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I'resent Compilation.
Reference

Sesson Law

New York

E 9-1-1930

Laws 1930, c. 709, as DECEDENT Es'r. LAW,
amended
by Laws sec. 124.
1940, c. 829, sec. 13.

Maryland

E 6-1-1937

Laws 1937 c. 546, as ANNO. CODE M). (1947
amended
by Laws Supp.) Art. 81, sec.
1947, c. 156.
126.

Pennsylvania

A 7-2-1937

Pub. Laws 1937, No. PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur(ion Supp. 1941) Title
565, p. 2762.
20, sec. 844.

Tennessee

EA 2-11-1943 Pub.
109.

Arkansas

A 2-24-1943

Act 99
142.

New Hampshire

A 5-11-1943

Laws 1943, c. 175, as
amended by Laws
1947, c. 102.

Massachusetts

A 6-11-1943

Acts, 1943, c. 519, as GENL. LAWS
(Ter.
amended
by
Acts Ed.) c. 65A, sees. 5,
1948, c, 605.
5A, 5B.

California

E 8-4-1943

Stats. 1943, c. 894.

Connecticut

E 7-18-1945

1945 Pub. Acts, Pub. GENL. STATS. CONN.
Act 280.
1949 Revision, c. 102,
sees. 2075-81.

Maine

* 7-21-1945

Laws 1945, c. 269.

Virginia

E 3-7-1946

Supp.
1946 Acts, c. 128, as 1946 CUMM.
amended
by
1947 VA. CODE seC. 5440b,
Acts, c. 60.
P. 399.

Delaware

A 4-2-1947

Laws 1947, c. 119.

Texas

E 9-4-1947

Laws 1947, c. 401.
(Limited Application)

Nebraska

EA 3-36-1949 Laws 1947, c.
(L.B. 158)

Acts

1943,

of 1943,

c.
p. 1 944 Cum. Supp.
Pope's ARK. STATS.
ANNO., p. 1341.

STATS. CALIF., 1941,
PROBATE CODE, secs.
970-77.

REVISED
STATS.,
C.
142, secs. 39A-39E;
Repealed by Laws
1947, c. 220.

VERN.,
ANN.
Civ.
STATS. Art. 3683a.

1949]

STATE TAX APPORTIONMENT

While New Jersey has no apportionment statute, a New
York Court, in applying the New Jersey law in the case of
a New Jersey domiciliary, 3 found that the New Jersey law
contained the principle of equitable apportionment, under
which even federal estate taxes are to be shared ratably
by those who receive benefits respectively under the will
and outside the will.24 The New Jersey cases relied upon
were Palmer v. Palmer,2'' Gaede v. Carroll2 and Phraner
v. Stone.- These cases all refer to the federal tax. In the
Gaede case, the language of the will was held to direct
payment of estate taxes only on property passing under
the will. The executors were held entitled to reimbursement from the widow for federal estate taxes paid on
proceeds of a life insurance policy of which she was beneficiary and on real property held by the entireties with the
widow. It would seem that a statute could have changed
the result in this case but little.2
Kentucky has no state apportionment statute, but we
find there a similar attitude of charging each class of beneficiaries with its share of the federal tax in absence of testamentary direction to the contrary. 9
One might conclude from the experience of New Jersey
and Kentucky that the result of the Riggs v. Del Drago
decision is to leave the problem of apportionment of the
federal estate tax to the states, even if they do not have
apportionment statutes. This would indicate that apportionment under the federal law3" is but permissive.
Texas enacted a very limited statute in 1947, which
seeks contribution only from the surviving spouse, based
on the portion of the net federal taxable estate represented
by the "survivor's interest in the community estate included
23See infra, material on conflict of jurisdiction.
"In re Goodman's Est., 66 N. Y. S. 2d 706 (1946).
135 N. J. Eq. 516, 39 A. 2d 438 (1944).
114 N. J. Eq. 524, 169 A. 172, 176 (1933).
27137 N. J. Eq. 284, 44 A. 2d 504, 509 (1945).
21 Compare Morristown Trust Co. v. Childs, 128 N. J. Eq., 524,
17 A. 2d
559 (1940) and Turner v. Cole, 118 N. J. Eq. 497, 179 A. 113 (1935) which
indicate that this is but a limited doctrine.
"Martin v. Martin's Adm., 283 Ky. 513, 142 S. W. 2d 164 (1940) : Trimble
v. Hatcher's Extrs., 295 Ky. 178, 173 S. W. 2d 985 (1943).
026U. S. C. A.., Secs. 826 (c) and (d).
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in the decedent's estate in the computation of the federal
estate tax."'
With the exception of the extremely brief Arkansas and
Texas statutes, the other apportionment acts have followed
the general pattern of the New York law.
Primarily because it is the statute that has undergone
the most progressive change, the Maryland statute has been
selected for relatively more detailed discussion in this
paper.
In 1937, the General Assembly of Maryland enacted a
relatively brief provision for proration of the federal estate
tax "between the individual estate of the decedent and the
trust estates created, or transfers made, by the decedent
in his lifetime so included in said gross estate".32 The
statute did not purport to be retroactive, and only applied
to estates of persons dying after June 1, 1937, which was
after its passage. The 1937 Act contained the usual provimLaws of Texas, 1947, c. 401. Apportionment generally applies to all the
Interests included within the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes,
with such statutory exceptions as are pointed out in other parts of this
paper. See, as to joint bank accounts, In re Halle's Will, 270 App. Dlv. 619,
61 N. Y. S. 2d 694 (1st Dept. 1946) ; In re Haliday's Estate, 184 Misc. 668,
53 N. Y. S. 2d 934 (Surr. Ct., N. Y. Co. 1944) ; see also In re Laemmle's
Estate, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 899 (Surr. Ct., Bronx Co. 1944), where executor was
allowed to retain bank books until donee of "Totten trusts" represented
thereby paid his share of the estate tax or furnished proper security therefore. Note also the statutory provision against subjecting banks to apportionment as to joint bank accounts in Laws of Mass., 1948, c. 605, Sec. 2.
See, as to United States savings bonds registered In testator's name, but
payable to beneficiaries on testator's death, In re Huhn's Will, 58 N. Y. S.
2d 287 (1945) ; In re Staheli's Will, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 185 (1945), aff'd., 66
N. Y. S. 2d 271 (1946).
See, as to proceeds of non-testamentary annuity contracts, In re Greenwald's Estate, 186 Misc. 654, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 937 (1945).
See, as to life insurance proceeds and dower interests, the various cases
cited in the sections of this paper devoted to those subjects.
See, as to gifts in contemplation of death, In re Hart's Estate, 184 Misc.
376, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 535 (1944) ; Matter of Blumenthal's Estate, 182 Misc.
137, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (1943), (aff'd., 267 App. Div. 949, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 652
(1944)) ; aff'd., 293 N. Y. 707, 56 N. R). 2d 588 (1944).
See, as to taxable powers of appointment, In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 180
Misc. 431, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 941 (1943) ; affd., 295 N. Y. 964, 68 N. E 2d 50
(1946). See also Harris' Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C. 378 (Orphans Ct., Phila. Co.
1939), pointing out the Pennsylvania practice of awarding appointed estates
to the personal representative of the donee-appointer to facilitate apportionment of the federal estate tax. See also Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416,
167 A. 597 (1933) In which this practice is approved. This list is admittedly
fragmentary, and reference should be made to the cases cited elsewhere
In this paper, especially for Instances of apportionment against Inter vivos
trust funds.
2 Md. Laws of 1937, c. 546.
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sion that the apportionment was not to apply in the face
of a contrary testamentary direction. No specific method
of procedure was provided, and many other details found
in the statutes of other states in later years were apparently
not anticipated.
Prior to the Del Drago decision in the Supreme Court,"
there was doubt as to the constitutionality of this statute.
In an article published in 1942, an argument similar to that
ultimately advanced by the Supreme Court in the Del
Drago case was made in objection to the reason for the
existence of the federal statute. 4 The primary concern of
the federal government, it was pointed out, is to collect
the taxes which Congress imposes. Distribution of the
burden of such taxes was said to be not only of no interest
to the federal tax collector, but an "unnecessary, although
not an unwarranted, invasion of territory naturally controllable by the State."
Furthermore, while the Maryland statute sought to correct the situation wherein the burden of the tax rested
disproportionately upon the residuary estate and upon the
proceeds of life insurance included in the gross estate, it
apparently accomplished only part of its purpose. It did
not mention any type of property included in the gross
estate but not in the executor's hands except inter vivos
trusts and transfers. 5 Thus, it is understandable that the
statute seemed to be in conflict with the federal provisions
for apportionment, which had singled out nothing but life
insurance proceeds at that time. 6 Even after the Supreme
Court had dispensed with the force of the objection as to
federal conflict by leaving the method of apportionment
to local law, it certainly could not be claimed that the
Maryland provisions brought about a truly equitable proration of the tax. Could the executor utilize both federal
" Supra,n. 6.
" Gump, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 6 Md. L. Rev. 195,
204 (1942).
81See New York recognition of this fact in Appl. of Chase Natl. Bk., 59
N. Y. S. 2d 848 (1946).
The statute at that time was held inapplicable to property held by the
decedent and widow as tenants by the entireties. Cook v. Zemon, Circt. Ct.
of Balto. City, June 6, 1946, Balto. Daily Rec., June 8, 1946.
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and state provisions for proceeding against recipients of
various shares of the estate? Did the subsequent enactment
of federal authorization to proceed against persons benefiting under certain powers of appointment help to clarify
this situation? These are typical of the questions which
were unsettled in the minds of many who had to reckon
with the situation in Maryland.
It has been pointed out that, under the 1937 Maryland
law, a court of equity to which a puzzled executor might
petition for advice would be faced with the five-fold realization that the federal act placed the burden primarily
upon the executor to pay the tax and allowed contribution
from life insurance beneficiaries (and later, appointees
under certain powers), and secondarily placed the burden
upon all other transferees; that the State Act placed the
primary burden upon the executor, but required contribution only from the trust estates created; that Maryland
case law held that personal property must first be used to
pay debts before realty; that Maryland case law held that
the residue is first subject to debts before specific or
general legacies and there was little authority which might
guide a court as to which of the apparently conflicting
schemes of distribution of the burden should govern." The
justifiable conclusion was expressed that the federal act
was constitutional, and that the Maryland statute was unconstitutional in that it was in conflict therewith.8
In an official Opinion of the [Maryland] Attorney General, 9 it was advised that a will which directed that "all
transfer, inheritance, estate or succession taxes be paid
out of my general estate" was an instance wherein "testator otherwise directs in his will", so that the federal estate
tax on a power of appointment under a trust set up in the
will of testatrix's father was not to be apportioned. The
"general estate" was said to mean testatrix's estate as distinguished from that of her father, and not to refer to the
Gump, op. cit., supra,n. 34, 202.
Ibid., 213-17. This was, of course, before the Supreme Court reversal
of the Del Drago case, hereinabove referred to.
"Opinion to the Register of Wills for Talbot County, July 26, 1939, 24
Op. Atty. Gen. 884 (Md. 1939).
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residuary estate of the testatrix. It was also pointed out
that the Maryland statute as it then ° stood required apportionment of the tax against a "trust estate created or transfer made by the decedent in his lifetime", and that such
language probably did not include the power under consideration.
The one case which, to this writing, has gone to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland is that of Fetting v. Flanigan.4 The case turned on the point of whether an auditor's
account which is finally ratified can be collaterally attacked
by questioning the enforceability of the decree issued
thereon. By way of dictum, however, the Court pointed out
that testamentary directions relieving certain legacies of
taxes are not by themselves capable of relieving from their
share of the federal estate tax certain life insurance benefits, joint bank accounts and other properties transferred
inter vivos to such legatees.42
In 1947, the General Assembly, aided considerably by
the experience of other states and by observation of the
nature of the litigation that arose in those jurisdictions,
passed an elaborate statute designed to cover many of the
important situations which had been brought to light in
the ten years since the first Maryland enactment.4 3 Except
so far as a portion of the new act might be held unconstitutional, the old statute was limited in application to estates
of decedents dying subsequent to June 1, 1937, but not
subsequent to June 1, 1947."4 Thus, the question of retroactivity was, for all practical purposes, again avoided.
45
The 1947 Act begins by solving, in its list of definitions
a problem left with varying results to court construction
in other states. The new Maryland law specifically provides that "the term 'Estate Tax' means the tax and interest40 levied" in the Estate Tax title of the U. S. Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, or amendments thereto.
,1939.
"185 Md. 499, 45 A. 2d 355 (1946).
185 Md. 499, 506, 45 A. 2d 355, 358 (1946).
,Md. Laws of 1947, c. 156.
"Md. Code (1939) Art. 81, Sec. 126, par. 2.
4Par.
1.
" Italics supplied.
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Contribution of a pro rata share of the total tax in the
ratio of the value of the particular property in the gross
estate to the "sum of the net estate and the amount of the
specific exemption allowed in computing the net estate"
is provided for as to property over which decedent had a
taxable power of appointment,47 proceeds of insurance policies "receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor"4"
and "any other property . . . which is not a part of the
true estate of the decedent".4 9
It is then provided that in the case of temporary interests, the entire amount of the contribution can be charged
against the "general residuary corpus" after "charges, debts
and gifts of specified sums or of specific assets without
apportionment between remainders and temporary interests'. 5
There follows a somewhat novel section designed in the
light of the realization that apportionment statutes have at
times worked to the disadvantage of these the decedent
wished most to protect. The surviving spouse is exonerated
from contributions under par. 3 a, b, and c, (but not d)
described above "to the extent the true estate of the decedent, plus all recoverable contributions hereunder, be
sufficient to discharge said tax" and as long as decedent
did not expressly direct otherwise." This exoneration does
not apply to temporary interests5 2 or to a spouse's share
in the "true estate". However, in computing the spouse's
interest in the "true estate", the executor is authorized to
deduct as a general obligation of the estate along with
administrative expenses the amount of the estate tax paid
but not reimbursed by contributions-except as decedent
directs otherwise in his will.
"Par. 3a.
"8Par. 3b.
"Par. 3c. The "true estate" is defined in par. 1 (f) as "all the real and
personal property owned by a decedent (whether he die testate or intestate)
which would pass to his heirs at law and next of kin under the Maryland
statutes of descent and distribution in case of intestacy".
80Par. 3d.
tm

Par. 4.

1 As in Par. 3d.
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The usual limitation that decedent may provide by will
for a different method of apportionment or for a different
incidence of the tax is found in par. 5.
The act sets up liability of contribution in a transferee
other than a bona fide purchaser, jointly and severally
with the transferor otherwise liable, but not in excess of
the amount by which the value of the property included in
the gross estate exceeds the value transferee paid for such
property. 3
After one year from the expiration of the period of
limitations upon assessment of the estate tax, the executor
can no longer enforce contribution for such tax.5 4
Enforcement and apportionment are made the exclusive
province of the equity courts." Many states have removed
such jurisdiction to the probate courts.5 6
The Act contains provisions of intent and severability
included in most well-drafted legislation today for guidance
of the courts.
Although the 1947 Maryland statute has not been able
to answer certain basic questions as to whether an executor
might apply federal proration provisions in conjunction
with these of the state, it has, by codifying the results of
foreign litigation and by anticipating other problems, reduced the potential volume of litigation. In so doing, it
has alleviated the relative confusion and enigma that have
been the progeny of solution.
An examination of the reported cases in the various
jurisdictions indicates the general problems which arise
under apportionment statutes, and furnishes a guide not
only as to possible court interpretation of similar statutes
elsewhere, but also as to needs for legislative remedy.
M

Par. 6.

Par. 7.
Par. 8.
See, for example, the provisions of the Delaware, Pennsylvania and
Tennessee statutes, ci., Moreland Estate, 351 Pa. 623, 42 A. 2d 63 (1945)
Crooks Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 58 (Orphans Ct., Lycoming Co. 1939).
t

Par. 9, 10.
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THE PROGENY OF SOLUTION

The Problem of Retroactivity
The problem of retroactivity is one which has troubled
many who have been concerned with the proration acts in
their early, transitional stages. In Pennsylvania, for example, it was held that the Act, the literal wording of
which made it effective in all cases in which the estate tax
had not been paid, in which final distribution had not been
made, was constitutional even if seemingly retroactive, for
the vesting of title in the heir or legatee is subject to estate
administration. 8 It is not made retroactive "merely because
the facts or requisites upon which its subsequent action depends, or some of them, are drawn from a time antecedent
to the enactment". 9
It seems that the statute might have been made effective
only as to estates of those who died after its enactment. In
such case, a testator could have had a chance to change his
dispositions to accord with the scheme of the new act.
In one case in which decedent had died prior to the
date on which the Pennsylvania act was effective, funds
in a joint bank account were made to bear their share of
the tax, even though, under local law title to such funds
vested instantly in the survivor. The Court found legislative intent to make the act applicable to all proceedings
pending on the effective day of the act from the words
"Whenever it appears upon any accounting or in any appropriate action or proceeding that [a certain person] has
paid an estate tax ...

the amount . . . shall be equitably

prorated.. ." The Court added that equitable contribution
was available in Pennsylvania apart from the Proration
Act, which merely broadened the Orphans' Court jurisdiction over persons liable for prorated shares of the tax.60
58

As to inter v vo8 trusts, it could be argued that such interests had become vested. However, the Court mentioned an additional view of the
statute in which the act would be regarded solely as regulatory of procedure, with the usual presumption against retroactive construction in such
cases. Jeffrey's Estate, 32 Pa. D. & C. 5, 16, et seq. (Orphans Ct., Phila.
Co. 1938), aff'd., 333 Pa. 15, 3 A. 2d 393 (1939).
'Ibid., 1114, citing at 12, Reynolds v. U. S., 292 U. S. 443, 448 (1933).
0Jones' Estate, 54 Pa. D. & C. 364 (Orphans Ct., Montgomery Co. 1945).
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It is apparent that judicious limitation of the principle
of retroactive application is being followed, nevertheless.
In a case in which the will set up a life estate, with the
remainder to form part of the residuary estate after the
death of the life tenant, the estate was held not to be pending during the entire life of the life tenant. Proration
sought on the basis of pending administration at the effective date of the act was denied. 1
In New York, the statute is somewhat more lenient in
its retroactive aspect. By its terms, it applies only to estates
of those who die on or after its effective date, September 1,
1930.62 However, according to Surrogate Delehanty, before
whose bench much of the pioneering litigation over the
New York act took place, the statutory declaration of
apportionment of the tax burden according to benefit is
merely a codification of pre-existing law, that where two
methods of computation of the tax are possible, the proper
one is "that which imposes the burden of the tax in proportion to the benefits received"."
It may at least be said that there is more justification
for this point of view than for that held in Pennsylvania,
for there is at least some measure of force in the assertion
that a testator is deemed to know that the estate tax laws
64
in force at his death will apply to his estate.
The controlling element for retroactive application in
New York is the date of decedent's death. Thus, although
decedent had created an irrevocable inter vivos trust prior
to the enactment of the statute, the beneficiary of the trust
was compelled to contribute to the federal estate tax, where
the settlor had died after the effective date of the proration
statute. 5
' In re Parker's Estate, 348 Pa. 211, 34 A. 2d 514 (1943).
N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, Sec. 124. See In re Randell's Est., 147 Misc.

358, 263 N. Y. S. 778 (1933).
1In re Lawrence's Estate, 162 Misc. 802, 806; 295 N. Y. S. 930, 935 (1937).
"Cf. In re Stanfield's Estate, 170 Misc. 447, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 613 (Surr.
Ct., N. Y. Co. 1939) and the oft-cited Matter of Duryea's Estate, 277 N. Y.
310, 14 N. E. 2d 369 (1938).
In re Ryle's Estate, 170 Misc. 450, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 597 (1939); Cf. 12
N. Y. S. 2d 337 for supplemental opinion. See also In re Mayer's Estate,
174 Misc. 917, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 468 (1940), where the federal tax was
apportioned against proceeds of trusts created and Insurance contracts
executed prior to the effective date of the statute.
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In the case of powers of appointment, New York has
held that it is the date of death of the donee which controls
the application of the statute.66
The California statute is by its terms applicable only to
"estates of persons dying after the effective date" thereof. 7
The Arkansas and Delaware statutes are silent upon the
point.
While the Virginia act does not mention retroactivity,
and although it was patterned after the Pennsylvania act,
it is likely that it will not apply to estates of those who die
before its effective date. The question is still of importance,
since the Virginia Act was effective for the first time on
March 7, 1946. Virginia courts have generally denied a
retroactive interpretation of statutes unless it is clearly
shown to have been intended."
There has been one case in the Chancery Court of the
City of Richmond, which would indicate that the courts
will regard the statute as inapplicable to estates pending
at the effective date of the statute, and applicable only to
6
those of persons dying after such effective date. 1
In Maryland, the recent act is specific in its application
to estates of these who die after its effective date, June 1,
1947, and the 1937 act, except so far as a portion of the new
act might be held unconstitutional, is limited to estates of
decedents dying subsequent to June 1, 1937, but not after
June 1, 1947.70
61n re Vanderbilt's Estate, 180 Misc. 431, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 941 (1943),
aff'd., 295 N. Y. 964, 68 N. E. 2d 50 (1946).
The effective date was August 4, 1943.
7 Cal. Stats., 1943, c. 894, 2741.
Cf., as to non-retroactivity, Crocker First Natl. Bk. v. Horgan, 74 Cal. App.
2d 917, 170 P. 2d 115 (1946) ; Security-First Nat. Bank v. Wellslager, 88
Adv. Cal. App. 220, 198 P. 2d 700 (1948).
v. Ferguson, 169 Va. 77, 87; 192 S. E. 774, 777 (1937)
8Ferguson
Glouster Realty Corp. v. Guthrie, 182 Va. 869, 873; 30 S. E. 2d 686, 688
(1944): See also Note, Virginia Statute on Apportionment of Federal
E8tate Taxe8, 34 Va. L. Rev. 370, 373 (1948) which points out that the
Virginia Department of Taxation has indicated that this law was not
meant to have retroactive effect.
"Letter to the writer from State Tax Commissioner of Virginia, Feb. 7,
1949.
'0Md. Code (1939) Art. 81, Sec. 126, par. 2, as amended by Md. Laws
(1947) c. 156.
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The Tennessee statute is specifically inapplicable to
estates of persons dying prior to the effective date of the
71
act, which was February 11, 1943.
Additional provision against retroactivity was evidenced
by the provision of the Texas act that the law was not to
be effective until ninety days after June 6, 1947, the date
of adjournment of the Legislature. 72 This does not, however, indicate whether reference is made to estates pending
at that time or to estates of decedents dying after that
date. 3
Massachusetts has followed the Pennsylvania theory,
and the Massachusetts statute specifically provides that the
act shall be inapplicable to taxes paid or distribution made
before its effective date.7 4 This interpretation now has court
approval. 7 Although the decedent in the Merchants Natl.
Bank case had died three years before the effective date
of the act; and, although an inter vivos trust included in
the taxable estate had been created eight years before the
effective date of the act, the statute was upheld. It was not
necessarily retroactive, according to the Court, since it
turned upon payment of the federal tax after its effective
date. It was immaterial that other related facts were antecedent to the statute.
It has been suggested 71 that a case might arise in which
the "degree of retroactivity was considerably greater"
than in the Merchants Natl. Bank case, and in which the
retroactive effect of the statute might be held by a state
or federal court to violate the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.
Although the 1945 Legislature saw the introduction
of a bill of repealer and of a bill to amend the act to apply
Tenn. Laws (1943) c. 109.
Texas Laws (1947) c. 401.
"See In re Clark's Estate, 105 Mont. 401, 74 P. 2d 401 (1937). (State
inheritance tax cannot reach pending estate where tax enacted after decedent's death.)
"1Mass. ,Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 65 A, as amended by Mass. Laws (1943)
c. 519, sec. 2.
,5 Merchants Natl. Bank v. Merchants Natl. Bank, 318 Mass. 563, 62 N. E.
2d 831 (1945) ; see Ferguson v. Mass. Audubon Society, 316 Mass. 447, 55
N. E. 2d 891, 897 (1944). (The effective date of the act is Sept. 9, 1943.)
"Address of Charles Y. Wadsworth, of the Boston Bar, before the Corporate Fiduciaries Association of Boston, on Oct. 24, 1945.
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only to instruments dated after its effective date, no action
was taken outside of the Senate Tax Committee. v
In the extended amendment of 1948, Massachusetts has
provided that the new provisions shall apply to "taxes paid
and distributions made "after the effective date of the
1943 act, unless the executor no longer (on January 1, 1949)
has in his hands as executor sufficient funds to readjust
the payments in accordance with the 1948 act.78 While the
1948 act was approved more than six months before its
effective date, the retroactive nature of the act is cast into
bold relief upon the realization that it might apply to the
estate of one who died before the 1943 act, but whose estate
was still pending with sufficient undistributed funds on
January 1, 1949.
New Hampshire provides that its statute shall apply to
estates wherein "estate and federal estate taxes have not
been paid" and to estates of persons dying after its passage.79 The seeming retroactivity of the statute has gone
unchallenged for over five years.8
Connecticut deemed it advisable to make her statute
applicable to estates of those dying on and after July 18,
1944, although the effective date of the act was July 18,
1945.81 In CentralHanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Peabody,8 2
in what was apparently the first reported decision on the
Connecticut act, the New York court, applying Connecticut
law where the Connecticut-domiciled decedent had created
a trust of property in New York with a New York trustee,
upheld the constitutionality of the retroactive provisions.
The court relied on In re Jeffery's Est.83 and Merchants
Nat'l. Bank v. Merchants Nat'l. Bank. 4
Although the problem of retroactivity is one which
loses its importance after a particular state statute has been
No. 412 and No. 344.
"Mass. Laws (1948) c. 605, secs. 3,4.
N. H. Laws (1943) c. 175, approved May 11, 1943.
o Letter to the writer from New Hampshire Assistant Attorney General,
Feb. 9, 1949.
Genl. Stats. Conn. (1949) sec. 2081.
82190 Misc. 66, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 256 (1947).
3 333 Pa. 15, 3 A. 2d 393 (1939).
"318 Mass. 56, 62 N. E. 2d 831 (1945), supra, n. 73. See Schiaroli,
First Reported Deoision on the Connecticut Tax Apportionnment Statutes,
21 Conn., B. J. 245 (1947).
'Senate
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in force a number of years, it is of considerable significance
today both as to those states wherein apportionment statutes have but recently been adopted and as to these states
which may in the future enact similar legislation. While
the decided cases reported outside of New York do not
number many, their absence might indicate (in addition
to the failure of many states to provide published reporting
of lower court decisions) the small number of cases in
which, so far, retroactive application of the statutes has
effected an undesirable result.
The Problem of JurisdictionalConflict
A natural result to be expected from the coexistence of
state statutes which differ from each other in varying
degrees and from the fact that certain states have apportionment statutes inapplicable to the federal estate tax,85
is a possible conflict of laws, a problem of extra-territorial
application of a state statute.
The New York cases seem to indicate that the controlling
factor in determining which statute is applicable is the
domicile of the decedent at death."6 Thus, a devisee of New
Hampshire real estate under the will of a testator domiciled
at death in New York was a "person interested in the estate" and therefore subject to contribution under the New
York statute.8 7 On the other hand, the New York statute
did not apply to the estate of a person domiciled at death
in Florida, even though the will was probated in New
York, where certain property lay.88
5 See, for example, several similar
statutes which are applicable, however, only to state taxes: N. D. Laws (1927) c. 267, sec. 8, as amended.
N. D. Laws (1931) c. 282 sec. 5 and N. D. Laws (1933) c. 251 sec. 3; R. 1.
Gen. Laws (1938) c. 43, sec. 33.
In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 8upra, n. 64; In re Strebeigh's Estate, 176
Misc. 381, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 569 (1941). Steinhardt, et al. v. Steinhardt, et al.,
192 Misc. 816, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 481 (1947) ; In re Rupertl's Est., 194 Misc. 376,
86 N. Y. S. 2d 887 (1949).
"In re Adams' Estate, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 587 (1940). The decision In this
case may be questioned on the ground that the basis of the power of
apportioning the tax to out-of-state property rests with the power of a
state to impose a state estate tax thereon. This is not possible as to
foreign real estate. See Schiaroli, Apportionment of Federal and State
Estate Ta.ce8 in Connecticut, 20 Conn. B. J. 198, 209-11 (1946).
5,
In re (Ben) Bernie's Estate, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 887 (1947).
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If the case is properly before the New York court, that
court will apply the law of the jurisdiction of decedent's
domicile at death as to apportionment of the federal estate
tax. Where decedent was a California domiciliary, New
York applied its interpretation of the California law in
holding that, although an inter vivos trust included in the
taxable estate provided that, for most purposes, settlor's
estate should bear the federal estate taxes, the trust was
held chargeable for its share of the tax where the will was
silent on the point."
Where testator was domiciled in the District of Columbia at death, the District law which included no separate
(other than federal) apportionment statute, was applied,
so that the residue of the estate bore the entire tax. An
inter vivos trust included in the taxable estate paid none
of the tax, although it had a New York situs and had to
be administered in New York, and although the will was
probated in New York. 0 In that case, the Surrogate pointed
out that a non-resident testator may choose by his will
to have his testamentary dispositions construed and regulated by the laws of New York."' In the case of a New
Jersey-domiciled decedent, the New York court looked to
the New Jersey law, and found that, while New Jersey
had no apportionment statute, it had followed a principle
that federal estate taxes are to be shared ratably by those
who receive benefits respectively under the will and outside
the will. 2
It should be remembered that the Surrogate (or other
person exercising similar power) cannot apportion estate
taxes unless he.has jurisdiction either in personam or in
rem."3 Where non-resident beneficiaries, who were cited
to attend before the New York Surrogate's Court for fixation of contributions under the apportionment statute, and
who were served outside New York under a New York
statute, appeared specially to claim unconstitutional depriApplication of Chase Natl. Bank, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 470 (1945).
o In re Berger's Estate, 183 Misc. 366, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 550 (1944).
183 Misc. 366, 368-9; 50 N. Y. S. 2d 550, 552 (1944).
"In re Goodman's Estate, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 706 (1946).
"In re Hegeman's Will, 270 App. Div. 707, 710: 62 N. Y. S. 2d 337, 339.
(1946), affd., 296 N. Y. 915, 73 N. E. 2d 37 (1947).
91Ibid.,
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vation of property and denial of due process, it was held
by the Surrogate that the New York court, in exercise of
its in rem jurisdiction, has full power to determine the obligation of contribution to the tax even against non-residents." On appeal, however, the lower court was reversed,
and the proceedings deemed to be in personam.95 This would
seem to jar the orderly process of settling jurisdiction by
the domicile-at-death test.
An example of the broad power of such jurisdiction is
the case of Cronise's Estate.6 Objectant unsuccessfully
claimed that the entire federal estate tax should have been
borne by the residuary estate. She was the devisee of
California realty and the life beneficiary of the residuary
trust. Decedent was a New York domiciliary. The Surrogate held that, since objectant was subject to the New
York apportionment law, the executor need not bring
action in California to recover the share of the tax allotted
to the California property, but could have the New York
court, under its "broadened equity powers" decree the impounding of so much of objectant's income as life beneficiary of the trust as would be requisite to satisfy her share
of the tax.
Efforts to enforce the decree of a probate court in one
state in the courts of another would have to meet the
challenge not only of jurisdiction and finality 7 but of the
extra-territorial effect of a state tax law or tax judgment. 8
The problem has apparently thus far been avoided by a
lack of antagonism between administrative officials of the
various states involved. 9
While the trend of case law seems to have created a
definite pattern of looking to the domicile of the decedent
"In re .Buckman's Estate, 183 Misc. 1, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 201 (1944).
See, supra, n. 93, 296 N. Y. 915, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 337 (1946) ; cert. del.
sub. nom. Kay v. MacCormick, 332 U. S. 763 (1947).
J167 Misc. 310, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 392 (1937).
97Decrees of probate courts are not always regarded as of sufficient finality
for foreign recognition.
"See Martin's Estate, 136 Misc. 51, 240 N. Y. S. 393 (1930) and Detroit
v. Proctor, 61 A. 2d 412 (Del. 1948) to the effect that courts of one state
will not enforce the tax laws of another state; and see Milwaukee County
v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935), to the effect that tax-founded
judgments of one state are entitled to full faith and credit in another state.
9See Schiaroli, Apportionment of Federal and State Estate Taxes in
toneeticut, 20 Conn. B. J. 198, 211-15 (1946).
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at death as the controlling factor in the determination of
which state law would be applicable in a conflict of jurisdictions, it was certainly not unwise for Massachusetts to
include in its 1948 amendment a specific provision that the
act applied to the "estate of any person who at the time of
his death was an inhabitant of" Massachusetts. 0 0
The Problem of Contrary Direction
The federal and state statutes generally contain the limitation that legislative provisions for apportioning the tax
shall not apply where the decedent directs to the contrary,
usually by will. The greatest mass of litigation on the subject of apportionment of death taxes has arisen over the
question of the nature or sufficiency of the testator's intent.
In certain cases the direction in the will has been clear.
Thus, where testator directed that "all estate, inheritance
and transfer taxes of every kind and character assessed
against my estate or any interest therein, passing hereunder" be paid from the residuary estate as an administrative expense, the Court held that the intent was sufficiently
shown to allow the residue to bear the share of taxes which
insurance policies in a trust would otherwise have borne
under the proration statute.'
Where intent is so clearly
indicated, the residue has been held to bear the entire tax
(as against recipients of jointly owned property or life
insurance proceeds) 0 2 even though, at the time of execution of the will, and at the date of death, deceased's net
estate passing under his will was less than the exemption
03
allowed by the federal estate tax.1
New York has taken the position that the statute commands apportionment, and a clear indication to the contrary
must be found in the will before the court will direct nonapportionment. The burden of proof must be met by those
100Mass. Laws (1948) c. 605, sec. 1.
101Crooks' Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 58 (Orphans Ct., Lycoming Co. 1939).
'See in re Reid's Will, 193 Misc. 154, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 248 (1948) ; In re
Stetson's Estate, 168 Misc. 836, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 546 (1938). Throughout this
paper, many testamentary provisions are quoted, not paraphrased, because
the writer feels that otherwise the practical benefit to be gained from a
survey
of the cases would be almost totally lost.
10 1 Brown's Estate, 59 Pa. D. & C. 6L8 (Orphans Ct., Lackawanna Co. 1.46).
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who seek to establish such direction against apportionment.' Indeed, the strictness of this position is highlighted
by judicial pronouncements that the contrary direction
provision of the statute is satisfied only if the will contains
a command or dictation to that effect, 10 5 and that for contrary intent, the Court should look for direction within
the four corners of the will, "as interpreted in the light of
the background against which it was drawn". 10 6
Where the testator directed fiduciaries merely to "pay
all my just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses", it
was held that there was no direction against statutory
apportionment. 10 7
There are many times when a testator makes a provision
in his will which is capable of interpretation in different
ways. Where testator bequeathed a certain sum to X "outright at my death", the Court found that the word "outright" did not sufficiently connote intention to relieve the
particular legacy from its proportionate share of the tax.'
Similarly, a testamentary direction that "all legacies herein
shall be free of tax" was held to show insufficient intent to
free the surviving joint owner of a bank account from her
share of the state inheritance tax under the proration act.'0 9
On the other hand, the words "without any deduction"
have been held strong enough to free preferred legacies
from the tax, even though there were insufficient funds to
pay all the general legacies in full.110 Payment "in full
,0,
In re Dettmer's Will, 179 Misc. 844, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 99 (1943) ; In re
Meynen's Estate, 173 Misc. 19, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 62 (1939) ; In re Kaufman's
Estate, 170 Misc. 436, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 616 (1939).
10In re Halle's Estate, 183 Misc. 858, 859-60, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 375, 378-9
(1944). See, however, modification in 270 App. Div. 619, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 694
(1946).
100In re Ryle's Estate, 170 Misc. 450, 464, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 597, 612 (1939).
Compare In re Searles' Will, 192 Misc. 689, 82 N. Y. S. 26 219 (1948). Compare, however, the relative leniency in Harris v. Friersen, 186 Tenn. 599,
212 S. W. 2d 591 (1948).
101In re Walbridge's Will, 170 Misc. 127, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 907 (1939). Compare In re Seeley's Estate, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (1943) with opposite holding
on somewhat similar provision in In re Mills' Estate, 189 Misc. 136, 64
N. Y. S. 2d 105 (1946) ; aff d., 297 N. Y. 1012, 80 N. E. 2d 535 (1948).
108
Edwards' Estate, 56 Pa. D. & C. 682 (Orphans Ct., Delaware Co. 1946).
The tax in this case was the Pennsylvania inheritance tax, which Is apportioned under the same state statutory provisions which apportion the
federal estate tax.
'9 Lamberton's Estate, 41 Pa. D. & C. 192 (Orphans Ct., Erie Co. 1940).
"0In re Caswell's Estate, 239 App. Div. 695, 268 N. Y. S. 691 (1984).
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out of my total estate available for distribution" has
been held to exempt a legacy from its share of the tax,
for the estate "available for distribution" was said to be
the estate remaining after payment of taxes, debts and
expenses."'
Although the California District Court of Appeals has
recognized that the California statute is patterned after
those of New York and Pennsylvania, it would seem that
the strictness of the New York requirement for clear intent
within the instrument directing against apportionment has
not been fully carried over. It was held that the direction
need not be in so many words, but might be gathered from
an interpretation of testator's words in the light of the law
existing at the time of the execution of the will. While the
words "inheritance taxes" do not in themselves include
federal estate taxes, the California Court held that there
was sufficient direction against apportionment of the federal
estate taxes in the provision to pay bequests in full "without deduction"12
It may be that somewhat ambiguous provisions of a will
can be explained in the light of the effect of the apportionment statute upon testator's dispositions. Where testator
directed payment of bequests seriatim until the trust fund
should be exhausted, after deducting "all expenses in connection therewith", the Court held that "all expenses" did
not include the federal estate tax. The Court was guided
partly by the fact that the resultant apportionment of the
tax allowed payment of part of each bequest, while a contrary holding would have deducted taxes first, allowed payment in full of certain bequests, and would have caused
abatement of those bequests lowest on the list. 1 3
"'In re Meynen's Estate, 173 Misc. 19, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 62 (1939). See
S..,

Horn Estate, 351 Pa. 131, 40 A. 2d 471 (1945), where, in charging the state
tax to the residuary estate, It was pointed out that It was not necessary to
use the word "residuary", as long as indication could be found to charge
taxes to the "estate before the payment of legacies and bequests". Compare
In re Randell's Estate, 147 Misc. 358, 263 N. Y. S. 778 (1933).
12Estate of Hotaling, 74 Cal. App. 2d 898, 170 P. 2d 111 (1946) ; petn. for
hearing by (California) Sup. Ct. den., Aug. 15, 1946.
"I In re Stanfield's Estate, 170 Misc. 447, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 613 (1939).
Compare In re Shalett's Estate, 193 Misc. 212, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 797 (1948).
Note, however that a testamentary direction as to priority of benefits does
not affect the system of proration of the tax under the statute. In re
Kelly's Will, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 441 (1949).
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In many instances, testamentary provisions have been
construed to indicate a direction against proration even as
to portions of the taxable estate which did not pass under
the will. Thus, a direction that "all ... estate . . .taxes
payable in respect of my estate"4 or of any legacy or devise
contained in this my will.., shall... be paid by my executors out of my general estate" was held to be comprehensive
enough to exempt insurance proceeds from their share of
the tax."' However, substantially similar language, such
as a direction that "all estate ... taxes imposed upon my
estate1 6 or any part thereof, or the transfer thereof or any
right of succession thereto, be paid out of my general estate"
was held to be insufficiently clear as a direction against
apportionment. In that the testator did not specify whether
he meant his "true estate" or his "taxable estate", the direction did not suffice to relieve taxable inter vivos trusts from
their share of the tax."7
Similarly, a direction that "all inheritance and death
taxes of every kind and character shall be paid out of my
estate and deducted as an expense of administration thereof
without any proration among any of the legatees herein
named" was found to show no intent to relieve insurance
proceeds payable to the widow, a joint bank account vested
in her by survivorship and Totten trusts passing to the
widow and children, of the burden of sharing the estate
taxes." ' A testamentary direction merely to "pay all taxes"
out of the residuary or general estate refers only to property passing under the will, and not to a (taxable) inter
vivos trust."9 Of course, if the will specifically provides
that taxes on "legacies, devises or bequests contained herein"'"2 be paid from the residue, there seems to be little
!" Inlics

supplied.
"UIn re Gibbs' Estate, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 60 (1942) ; compare In re Aldrich's
Will, 259 App. Div. 162, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 420 (1940).
nO Italics supplied.
"'In
re Mills Will, 272 App. Div. 229, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 746 (1947) ; aff'd.,
297 N. Y. 1012, 80 N. E. 2d 535 (1948) ; see also In re Goffe's Estate, 73
N. Y. S. 2d 800 (1947).
"1 In re Kalik's Estate, 179 Misc. 872, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 53 (1942). Compare
In re Van Hoesen's Will, 192 Misc. 689, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 392, 398-9 (1948).
"1 Chase Natl. Bank v. Tomagno, 172 Misc. 63, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 759
(1939);
but see Reed's Estate, 45 Pa. D. & C. 628 (Orphans Ct., Montgomery Co.
1942).
Italics supplied.
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question as to intent to exempt property outside the will
from the tax.' 2 ' Although state property law treats property passing under a power of appointment as passing
under the estate of the donor of the power, a direction
that all estate taxes be paid from the residuary estate,
and that "all the foregoing gifts, legacies and devises" be
free from "any such taxes" was held to express intent to
remove the tax burden even from gifts made by testa1 2
mentary exercise of powers under the facts of the case.
On the other hand, where the testator directs that all taxes
payable "in respect of any property or interest passing
under this my ... will" shall be charged to the residuary
estate, the Court has held that property passing by means
of testator-donee's testamentary exercise of powers created
by his father would not be freed from its share of the tax
1 23
in testator-donee's estate.
A testator does not always have the power totally to
prevent the operation of the statute. In a case in which
testatrix had provided that taxes were to be paid from
the residue, and that bequests and legacies should be free
of taxes, it happened that the amount of the tax was far
greater than the value of the residuary estate. The Court
apportioned the deficit as an abatement equally among the
general and specific legacies. The intent of the testatrix
thus kept the general legacies from paying the entire deficiency and also kept the tax from being apportioned more
broadly under the act"2
Even where there is a specific direction in the will that
federal estate taxes be paid from the residuary estate, proration of the tax among all legacies has been ordered where
25
no residuary estate existed.1
See In re Appel's Estate, 189 Misc. 417, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 772 (1947).
In re Duryea's Estate, 250 App. Div. 305, 293 N. Y. S. 985 (1937);
aff'd.,
277 N. Y. 310, 14 N. E. 2d 369 (1938).
t
In re Rogers' Will, 159 Misc. 86, 287 N. Y. S. 426 (1936).
White Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C. 408 (Orphan's Ct., Phila. Co. 1948).
In re Burr's Estate, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 905 (1947) ; In re Martin's Estate,
176 Misc. 805, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 159 (1941) ; In re Halsted's Estate, 174 Misc.
292, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 627 (1940) ; cf. In re Wollnsky's Estate, 73 N. Y. S. 2d
757 (1947), where proration was ordered among all legacies even though the
will provided for priority in payment of particular legacies.
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However justly or logically the assumption may follow,
testamentary silence is deemed to indicate a desire to have
the taxes apportioned according to the existing'2 6 statute,
12 7
in the light of which testator is said to have been acting.
The fact that a will and a codicil drawn four years
after the passage of the New York act, but without express
direction against apportionment, were drawn by an experienced lawyer was held to be an additional factor in indicating lack of testamentary intent to vary the statutory
scheme of tax incidence.2 8
In certain cases, apportionment is not carried out because of the special legal position of the recipient of property included in decedent's estate. Where, for example,
testator provided that testamentary provisions for his
widow were intended in lieu of dower and other statutory
interests, the widow's acceptance of these provisions rendered her a "quasi-purchaser", so that she was exonerated
from contribution to the payment of estate taxes.'29 In a
similar case, although the testamentary direction did not
clearly provide that taxes due to the inclusion of an inter
vivos trust in the gross estate were to be paid out of the
residuary estate, the Court freed the trust of any portion
of the tax, where the husband had created the trust under
a separation agreement, in full settlement of all claims of
his wife. The Court regarded the wife as a paid creditor.' °
'"As pointed out in the section of this paper on retroactivity, the applicable law may not be that existing either at the date of execution of the
will or at the date of death.
I- Geary's Estate, 55 Pa. D. & C. 375 (Orphans Ct., Clinton Co. 1946) ; of.
Security-First Natl. Bank v. Wellslager, 88 Adv. Cal. App. 220, 198 P.
2d 700 (1948).
"I In re Dennis' Estate. 184 Misc. 178, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 797 (1945).
20In
re Klein's Estate, 175 Misc. 961, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 869 (1941). It should
be pointed out that those who benefit by the payment of debts or expenses
of the estate or of administration are not "persons Interested in the estate"
who would be subject to apportionment under the statute. In re Oppenheimer's Estate, 166 Misc. 522, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 786 (1938).
10In re Brokaw's Estate, 180 Misc. 490, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 57 (1943), affd.,
293 N. Y. 555, 59 N. E. 2d 243 (1944). See also In re Strebeigh's -state,
176 Misc. 381, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 569 (1941) where payments from a testamentary trust received by a divorced wife pursuant to agreement were
not apportioned because such former spouse was held to be a creditor.
Accord: In re Neller's Estate, 356 Pa. 628, 53 A. 2d 122 (1947). See, however, apparently contra: In re Stadtfeld's Estate, 359 Pa. 147, 58 A. 2d 478
(1948).
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Lest the import of the above cases be misunderstood,
it should be pointed out that the dower interest of a wife
not only is includable in the gross estate 3 ' but that such
dower interest must bear its share of the tax unless there
is proper direction to the contrary. The Arkansas Court,
perhaps broadening its narrow statute, held that the words
"distributees and/or beneficiaries of the estate" were used
in its proration act'3 2 in a non-technical sense, including a
surviving spouse. 3' In another case, the legatee was the
debtor of the testatrix. Testatrix bequeathed promissory
notes to her sister-in-law, who was obligated upon them.
The bequest, however, was subject to the condition that
the sister-in-law pay all taxes that would arise because of
the inclusion of the note in the testatrix's estate. The Court
held that this condition expressed the intent that sister-inlaw should bear only such tax in respect to this gift, and
not her proportionate share of the total estate tax based on
18 4
the amount of her gift in relation to the gross estate.
While the language of some of the statutes, such as
that of Virginia, to the effect that one can express an
effective direction against apportionment "by will or by
written instrument executed inter vivos"' 85 is somewhat
more ambiguous than the explicit limitation in the Connecticut statute to the effect that an inter vivos trust direction against apportionment only applies to the tax on such
inter vivos funds,' it seems quite probable that no state
intended to allow the apportionment vel non of taxes on
property passing under the will to be governed by a non37
testamentary direction.
At times, there may be an apparent conflict between
provisions in the will and in the inter vivos agreement. In
one case, settlor in a taxable inter vivos trust provided that
payment of federal estate taxes "which may be assessed

1

20 U. S. C. A. See. 811b; Mayer v. Relnecke, 130 F. 2d 350 (C. C. A. 7th
1942) ; cert. den., 317 U. S. 684 (1942).
Ark. Stats. (1944) 1341, as added by Act 99 of 1943, 142.
Terral v. Terral, 212 Ark. g21. 229; 205 S. W. 2d 198, 202 (1947).
11 In re Jamison's Will, 272 App. Div. 434, 71 N. Y. S. 2d (1947).
" Va. Code Supp. (1946) Sec. 5440 b, as added by 1947 Acts, c. 60, Sec. 6.
"
Conn. Genl. Stats. (1949) Sec. 2076.
'
See New York Laws 1940, c. 829 Sec. 13, amending the New York Act
In this regard.
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against the estate of the grantor" be made from the principal of the trust. Eighteen days later, deceased drew her will
and directed payment of all estate taxes upon her estate or
any transfer under the will to be made from the residuary
estate. The Court read the two apparently inconsistent
instruments together to find decedent's intent, and found
that the principal of the trust estate was to be charged with
the tax attributable to the inclusion of the trust fund
in the gross estate. Apparently, the residuary estate bore
the remainder of the tax burden.'3 8
It is of the utmost importance, as the decisions in these
cases indicate, that draftsmen of wills and trusts draw their
instruments with exceeding care. The efficacy of the
statutes seems to depend on this.
The Problem of Temporary Interests
Most of the state statutes have obviated one administrative difficulty by providing that the share of tax prorated
to a temporary interest shall be payable out of the principal
or corpus, not out of the income. Were it not for such provision, there would obviously be a great difficulty of collecting the tax from the share that might be charged to the
recipient of periodic income.
In a typical case, the life beneficiary of a testamentary
trust had the right to receive four thousand dollars annually. The estate taxes properly chargeable to the trust
estate were held to be payable wholly out of the capital
of the trust, without obligation for refund.'
This procedure has been followed even though the re40
mainder was to charity.'
As pointed out in the section of this paper dealing with
direction against apportionment, most states allow the
statute to be avoided not only by testamentary direction
to that effect, but also, as to certain inter vivos funds, by
m In re Weiskotten's Estate, 167 Misc. 67, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 810 (1938).
9In re Provot's Estate, 188 Misc. 802, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 437 (1946). See
also Chase Natl. Bank v. Tomagno, 172 Misc. 63, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 759 (1939).
"' In re Blumenthal's Will, 182 Misc. 137, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (1943) ; af'd.,
267 App. Div. 949, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 652 (1944) ; aff'd.. 293 N. Y. 707, 56 N. E.
2d 588 (1944).
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direction in the instrument setting up such funds."' However, a declaration of trust, in providing for payment of the
share of estate taxes on the value of the trust estate "out
of principal" refers only to corpus as distinguished from
income, and not to general as opposed to residuary
legacies.'4 2 Such direction may not always preclude partial
effect of the statute. For example, where decedent had
created an inter vivos trust in which he provided that "any
... taxes due upon the passing of the trust estate.., shall
be computed upon and paid from the corpus, so that life
estates hereunder shall be so enjoyed free from deduction
for any such taxes", the Court held that there was no intent
against proration, only an intent to protect the life estate
from income deduction because of the tax. However, such
intent was held not to preclude an "indirect deduction consequent upon a reduced income upon a reduced principal
occasioned by payment of taxes from principal". 4 '
What if testator directs that the taxes be paid out of
the income of the trust, and that they be not, in the statutory manner, charged against corpus? In a case in which
such testamentary direction was apparently made, the
Surrogate refused to charge the income, and followed the
statutory method. The reasoning of the Surrogate was
that the statute makes the tax a charge against corpus, and
a testamentary direction to pay the tax from income "must
be taken to be a direction to reimburse the corpus out of
the income to the extent of the tax paid". The process of
reimbursement would require the accumulation of income,
which is invalid under local statute.'4 4 Thus, since testator
could not have intended an illegal provision, the tax was
charged to the corpus. 4 '
1 Where the trust instrument itself provided for payment out of the trust
of "all costs, charges and expenses of said trust and of the management
thereof", it was held that the federal estate tax was such a "charge".
Jeffery's Estate, 32 Pa. D. & C. 5, 8-10 (Orphans Ct. Phila., Co. 1938).
"I Security-First Nati. Bank v. Wellslager, 88 Adv. Cal. App. 220, 198 P.

2d 700 (1948).

McLaughlin's Estate, 39 Pa. D. & C. 573 (Orphans Ct., Phila. Co. 1940).
Citing In re Billings' Estate, 268 Pa. 71, 110 A. 768 (1920).
"
In re Matthews, 164 Misc. 578, 300 N. Y. S. 461 (1937). Another aspect
of the problem of temporary interests is seen in the many cases in the
section of this paper on direction by will or otherwise against apportionment of the share of the tax such temporary interests would otherwise
hear under state statutes.

19491

STATE TAX APPORTIONMENT

Some mention should be made at this point of the treatment of annuities. New York legislative history was relied
upon to indicate that the apportionment statute was not
intended to change the pre-existing rule that the tax on
testamentary annuities is chargeable primarily to the fund
from which they are to be paid, valued as of the date of
death of testator. 4 ' However, the amount of such tax
should then be amortized out of the respective annuities.1 47
It should be noted that an insurance company which
agrees to pay an annuity has been held to be a debtor rather
than a trustee or transferee. Thus, where the beneficiaries
of such annuity paid a deficiency in the federal estate tax,
the insurance company was not liable under state appor14
tionment provisions. 1
The Problem of Insurance Proceeds
To some extent, the intended effect of the apportionment statutes is nullified in Pennsylvania, New Jersey
and Kentucky, which have apparently followed the reasoning of a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Helvering"4 in holding that an insurance company which holds proceeds of an insurance policy
on decedent's life cannot be made to pay the share of tax
prorated to such proceeds.'5 0
The effect of such a ruling, it is pointed out, is to cause
other portions of the gross estate to bear more than their
pro rata shares of the tax. While beneficiaries of insurance
policies are liable for payment of the tax, there are cases
in which their primary means of paying such tax would be
the proceeds held by the insurance company, perhaps to
be paid out slowly over a period of years. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has held that even if the insurance
company were liable as a person "interested in the estate
In re Starr's Estate, 157 Misc. 103, 282 N. Y. S. 957 (1935).
"'In re Blumenthal's Will, 182 Misc. 137, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (1943)
aft'd., 267 App. Div. 949, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 652 (1944) ; aff'd., 293 N. Y. 707,
56 N. E. 2d 588 (1944) ; In re Brown's Estate, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 624 (1943).
I" Hughes v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 159 F. 2d 110 (C. C. A. 7th
1946).
"'128 F. 2d 745 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
'BO See cases and discussion in Wentling, ITnsurance Proceeds and Estate
Tax Proration,9 U. of Pitts. L. R., 157 (1948).
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to whom such property is or may be transferred or to whom
any benefit accrues",' the company could not be made
to pay the tax in a lump sum, where it was not required by
the insurance contract to pay the insurance proceeds in a
lump sum. 5 2
The executor is thus left to recover from the beneficiary
under the federal'53 or applicable state statute. Thus, until
the executor can recover the tax from the beneficiary, the
residuary legatee may bear the burden of the tax prorated
to the insurance proceeds.
If the executor, under the Pennsylvania rule, had to
attach the monthly insurance proceeds each month until
the share of the tax were paid, the decedent's immediate
family might suffer immeasurably in a case wherein the
decedent had planned to care for them by what he considered the safest, surest part of his estate-life insur54
ance.1
New York, on the other hand, has held the insurance
company liable for lump sum payment of the prorated
share of the tax even where the company was to make
payments to the beneficiary over a period of years. Surrogate Delehanty stated that, in an insurance policy which
provides for installment payments, state law is to be read
into the contract, making the tax immediately payable out
of the corpus. The remaining corpus is then to be the basis
for actuarially readjusted payments to the beneficiary.'5 5
The Appellate Division affirmed as to proration, and held
that the insurance company was to be regarded no longer
as an insurer after insured's death, but as an investor of
funds, with the right to delay payment to the beneficiary
until it had disposed of part of the corpus for taxes. The
Appellate Division, however, held that payment by the
m1The court held it was not so liable.
Moreland's Estate 351 Pa. 623, 42 A. 2d 63 (1945).
26 U. S. C. &. See. 826c; svpra, n. 13.
Just as often, perhaps, the family take the residue, In which case the
apportionment statute Is designed to be of aid to the family. Note Prifer's
Estate, 53 Pa. D. & C. 103, 114 (OrphansCt., Schuylkill Co. 1945) in which
the fact that part of the insurance proceeds was payable in the style of an
annuity, with the beneficiaries receiving but small portions of the proceeds
at the time, was one of the factors favorable to the construction that testatrix's intention was to place the entire tax burden upon the residuary estate.
' Scott's Estate, 158 Misc. 481, 286 N. Y. S. 138 (1936).
1
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insurer would not accelerate its contractual obligations,
which, it pointed out, were based upon the amount it received in premiums.' 6
Thus, under the New York rule, before an insurance
company can pay proceeds to a beneficiary, it must assure
itself of the extent of estate tax liability which attaches
to such proceeds. The resultant expedient of payment to
the beneficiary and executor jointly defeats part of the
desirable feature of prompt payment usually inherent in
insurance benefits.
In the Scott case, the insurance company still held the
proceeds at the time it was ordered to pay the tax. Where
part of the insurance proceeds have been distributed and
the recipients of such proceeds have dissipated their benefits before the administrator has secured contribution from
them, the administrator cannot charge the remaining undistributed insurance proceeds still in insurance company
hands with the entire tax.'" In Zahn's Estate,5 8 the insurance company had paid all the proceeds to the beneficiary,
and the beneficiary had dissipated the funds and died a
pauper. Even there, the Surrogate found a right in the
government against the company, to which he allowed
the executor to be subrogated. 15 9 The decision in the lower
court has been reversed, however.'6 ° The Appellate Division holds that the insurer who has paid the proceeds of
a policy to a beneficiary on the death of the insured is
not a "person interested in the estate" or a "person in possession of taxable property", so as to be subject to recovery
of the tax on such proceeds by the executor under the
statute. Furthermore, the federal government is found
to have no right against the insurer to which the executor
BIn re Scott's Will, 249 App. Div. 542, 293 N. Y. S. 126 (1937), aff'd.
mem., 274 N. Y. 538, 10 N. E. 2d 538 (1937) ; cert. denied sub. noin. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 320 U. S.
721 (1937). See, however, as to annuities, Hughes v. Sun Life Assur. Co.
of Canada, 159 F. 2d 110 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
'In re Rappaport's Estate, 167 Misc. 164, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 616 (1938).
69 N. Y. S. 2d 829 (1947).
'm See criticism, Note, Inheritance Taxes-Collection and EnforcementInsurance Co. Must Reimburse Executor For the Estate Tax Attributable to
Proceeds of a Policy Although Company Has Paid Beneficiary, 60 Harv. L.
Rev. 1162 (1947).
'1 In re Zahn's Estate, 273 App. Div. 476, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 904 (1948).
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could be subrogated. The executor paying the tax must
seek reimbursement from the beneficiary.' 6 '
An interesting variation was presented in a case in
which the estate was insolvent except for the proceeds
of insurance purchased by a trust which decedent had
created in his lifetime. The entire federal estate tax was
16 2
charged against the trustee.
In Massachusetts, the problem is perhaps as great, although the statute does make special provision not usually
found in the apportionment statutes of other states. Section
5A, Ch. 65A, Genl. Laws, provides that no tax or part
thereof shall be recovered from (among others) any life
insurance company. 163 Although the federal and state
statutes allow the executor to collect a pro rata share of
the federal estate tax from the beneficiary of an insurance
policy, there is a serious problem, as pointed out above, in
cases in which decedent or beneficiary has elected an
option under which the company retains the proceeds
and pays the proceeds under an installment system. Even
if the proceeds are paid directly to the beneficiary, they
may be dissipated by the time the tax is prorated.6
The Problem of Charitable Bequests
To a certain extent, charities are often favored in the
law. In the case of apportionment of the federal estate
tax, the question has presented itself as to whether, in
the face of statutes generally silent upon the point, charities were to bear their share of the tax.
A Pennsylvania testator bequeathed a specific sum of
money to each of two charities and the rest of his estate
' See also In re Krauss, 185 Misc. 21, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 702 (1945) where
an insurance company which had paid all of the proceeds to the beneficiary
was held not liable to recovery by the executor even though the executor
had notified the insurer prior to such payment that the insurer was
chargeable for a share of the federal estate tax and that the executor would
hold the company liable therefore.
In re Oppenheimer's Estate, 166 Misc. 522, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 786 (1938).
Compare the New Hampshire statute which apparently provides that
proceeds of life Insurance policies are not at all subject to apportionment.
N. H. Laws (1943) c. 175, as amended by Laws 1947, 102.
16 This problem was one of the elements of doubt inherent in the Massachusetts statute discussed at a meeting of the Corporate Fiduciaries Association of Boston (Oct. 24, 1945).
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to a large testamentary trust. The Auditor raised the question of whether the charitable legacies should bear their
proportionate share of the federal estate tax under the
state proration act. The Court held that the words of the
apportionment statute directing that "allowances shall be
made for any exemptions granted by the act imposing the
tax, and for any deductions allowed by such act, for the
purpose of arriving at the value of the net estate"' 5 indicated a legislative intention to recognize the exemptions of
the federal act imposing the tax, and not to require contribution by charities. The case of the charities, said the
Court, is not one wherein the executor has (in the words
of the statute) "paid an estate tax ... with respect to any
property required to be included in the gross estate ...
under the provisions of any such law."' 66
Where testatrix effectively so directed in her will, the
charitable bequests had to bear their share of the tax. This
was true even though the will contained no specific words
to that effect, but the testatrix's intention was gathered
from the fact that the tax was to be paid from the residue,
and the charitable bequests were part of a number of
bequests from such residue, each preceded with the phrase,
"One equal part or share thereof I give ...,17
Another type of situation in which a charity had to bear
at least part of its share of the tax arose in New York.
Testator had left the bulk of his large estate as a residuary
trust to his children for life and with remainder largely to
charities. At the time the case arose, the life estates had
ended, and a method of computation of the tax and proration thereof was sought. Since the charitable deduction
allowed was only the value of the remainder at testator's
death, there now existed, at the end of the life estates, a
larger fund payable to the charities than had been allowable as a deduction. It was held that the charities had to
pay that part of the tax which was based on the portion
These words are copied in statutes of other states.
'"Wilkinson's Estate, 37 Pa. D. & C. 240 (Orphans Ct., Phila. Co. 1940);
to similar effect: Harvey Estate, 350 Pa. 53, 38 A. 2d 262 (1944) and
Harvey's Estate No. 2, 49 Pa. D. & C. 440 (Orphans Ct, Phila. Co. 1944).
See also In re Starr's Estate, 157 Misc. 108, 282 N. Y. S. 957 (1935).
I" North's Estate, 50 Pa. D. & C. 703 (Orphans Ct., Phila. Co. 1944).
'6
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of the trust formerly held as a life estate, the portion above
the amount allowed as a deduction in the computation of
the tax.16
In general, where the will is silent as to apportionment
vel non, a charitable remainder will suffer in that the corpus
of a temporary interest, even though the remainder is to
charity, must bear its share of the tax. 6 '
The Problem of Penalty and Interest
on Delinquent Payment
While the various apportionment statutes provide for
the proration of the estate tax itself, the incidence of the
burden of the penalty and interest upon delinquent payment of the tax has generally been left for the determina70
tion of the courts.1
Draftsmen of wills seem upon occasion to have been
as lax as draftsmen of legislation. One taxpayer, life beneficiary of a residuary trust under a Pennsylvania will, was
faced with the problem, when the will merely provided for
payment out of the general estate of all estate and inheritance taxes chargeable upon the estate or upon any bequest
or trust under the will. Nothing was provided in the will
about the manner of payment of interest on estate tax deficiency. The Circuit Court of Appeals. 7' affirmed the ruling
of the Tax Court 72 in directing the payment of such interest
from the trust income, not from corpus. In this decision,
the Court relied upon local Pennsylvania law to the effect
that the life tenant, not the remainderman, must bear the
estate
burden of interest upon indebtedness of a decedent's
173
or upon incumbrances on decedent's property.
At the time of this decision, Pennsylvania had already
held that, since Congress intended to include interest on
the tax as part of the estate tax, the Pennsylvania act,
1In re

Dettmer's Will, 179 Misc. 844, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 99 (1943).
1In re Blumenthal's Estate, 182 Misc. 137, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (1944)
aff'd., 267 App. Div. 949, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 652 (1944) ; aff'd.., 293 N. Y. 707, 56
N. I. 2d 588 (1944).
" See 26 U. S. C. A. Sees. 890-3 as to such penalty and interest.
l
Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Pearson, 154 F. 2d.256 (C. C. A. 3rd 1946).
2
4 T. C. 218 (1944).
"I Cited to similar effect: Penrose v. U. S., 18 F. Supp. 413 (E. D. Pa,
1937).
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which refers to the federal tax, contemplated the proration
1
of such interest.

74

However, there is a recent lower court decision in Pennsylvania to the effect that interest paid on the additional
federal estate tax should be charged to the corpus of a
trust included within the estate. 175 The Court admitted

that, for income tax purposes, there was authority that the
Pennsylvania act and the Mellon case did not change the
general rule that interest upon a debt of an estate, including
interest on a deficiency estate tax, is to be charged against
the income of the estate. 176 The Court in the Castner estate
based its conclusion on the fact that the Pennsylvania Proration Act of 1937 provides that, as between life tenant and
remainderman of a trust estate, there shall be no apportionment.
New York has followed at least two theories in connection with the incidence of the interest on delinquent
tax payments. In the Clark case,1 77 the court apportioned
the interest on the tax in the same ratio as it had apportioned the tax. Since the will provided that taxes be paid
from the corpus of the testamentary trust, the interest was
charged to the corpus. This approach has been followed
78
by several other New York courts.1

A somewhat different approach is to be found in the
Hartjes case. 179 There, the will was silent as to interest on
the tax. The Court applied the income of the estate to
the payment of the interest on the tax. The theory is that
of the sovereign's toll on the principal of an estate at the
17'Mellon Estate, 347 Pa. 5-0,
15In re Castner's Estate, 59

533, 32 A. 2d 749, 756 (1943).
Pa. D. & C. 370, 63 Montg. 135 (Orphans Ct.,

Montgomery Co. 1948).
'7'
The court cited Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Pearson, suipra, n. 171.
See Crooks' Estate, 36 Pa. D. & C. 58 (Orphans Ct., Lycoming Co. 1939).
17 In re Clark's Estate, 169 Misc. 202, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 176 (1938).
'78Estate of Korn, no opinion for official publication, (Surr. Ct. N. Y. Co.
1938) ; Matter of Andrus, 169 Misc. 740, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 736 (1938) (since
interest was to be paid from corpus, executor was not excused from distributing income from a testamentary trust merely because the statute provided that he was not required to transfer "any fund or property with
respect to which a federal . . . tax is imposed" until transferee paid his
share of the tax or furnished security) ; In re Sinsheimer's Will, 21 N. Y. S.
2d 573 (1940) Chase Nat'l. Bk. of N. Y. v. MacKenzie, 192 Misc. 174 76
N. Y. S. 2d.19 (1947).
. 1.9Matter of Hardes, 17.0 Misc. 481, 10 N. Y. S. 2d .627 (1939).
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instant of one's death. No one can share the income until
the tax and interest have satisfied the toll.8 0 In a recent
application of this doctrine, it was held that a testamentary
direction for payment of the tax out of trust corpus did not
relate to interest on a delinquent tax payment. Interest
"earned
was charged to income to the extent income was
181
sovereign"
the
by
exacted
sum
on the principal
The latter limitation is not to be found in the Harjes
case, but the Kent case was not the first to enunciate it.
A year before, another New York court had held that
interest payable by a trustee on the portion of the federal
estate tax allotted to his inter vivos trust was payable out
of trust income, but only to the extent of "income derived
from the amount of such tax... which is earned from and
after the due date of the tax, to wit: fifteen months from the
82
death of the decedent".1

The great divergence of the second approach from that
of the Clark case can be seen in the Chambers case.1 3 Al-

though the will provided that all taxes be paid from the
general estate, and although the New York statute provided
that the tax was to be paid from the corpus of a trust or
other temporary interest; interest on the federal estate tax
was held not to be a part of the "tax", and so was allocated
between the principal and income of a testamentary trust.
The apportionment statute did not change the common law
rule that interest on debts is payable from income. However, only such income as was earned on the principal of
the federal tax after it became due could be charged with
the interest. The Court realized that it was not following
Clark and Andrus, for that would have resulted in "un1 4
necessary hardship upon the remaindermen" in this case.
1soSee also In re Ryle's Estate, 170 Misc. 450, 10 N. Y. S.2d 597 (1939).

In re Kent's Estate, 191 Misc. 939, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 596 (1948).
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Peabody, 190 Misc. 66, 68
N. Y. S. 2d 256 (1947).
10 In re Chambers' Estate, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 88 (1945).
184A recent case following the Chambers case is In re Reid's Will, 193
Misc. 154, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 248 (1948), wherein it was stated that the apportionment vel non of penalty interest is not governed by the New York
apportionment statute or by testamentary direction as to payment of "taxes".
Penalty interest on the federal tax is not part of the tax, and may receive

different treatment. Here, it was payable from "income earned at the
average rate of return on that portion of the trust principal devoted to the
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While Maryland now solves the problem by defining
the term "estate tax" to mean "tax and interest",'8 5 the
problem in most states may be left to turn upon the local
rules as to liability for debts of an estate or for the interest
on state death taxes.'8 " Since trusts generally earn less
(under prevailing economic conditions which may be with
us for years to come) than the amount of the interest and
penalty on delinquent taxes, a particular burden is placed
upon those made liable for the payment of such interest
and penalty to ascertain the local interpretation of this
seemingly minor point of the law, and to avoid the results
that would follow from late payment of the tax. Remedy
upon this point may more satisfactorily be legislative than
dependent upon the problematical effect of testamentary
direction.

IV.

PARTIAL FAILURE AND SOME SUGGESTIONS

While many another state was reaching out for statutory
apportionment, Maine speedily repealed"' the proration
statute it had adopted but two years before. 8 The reasons
behind this decisive action serve to shed much light upon
the faults of most statutes of the type considered in this
paper.'89 While there was apparently no discussion of the
bill 9 ° to repeal the statute in the legislature itself, there
was discussion before the Judiciary Committee.'9 ' While
no record is kept of such proceedings, some of the arguments presented have been made available to the writer
by various Maine attorneys, and will be examined briefly.
payment of estate taxes, for the period commencing fifteen months from
the death of testator" and trust principal was to bear the balance, if any,
of such penalty interest.
13Md. Code, Art. 81 (1939) Sec. 126, Par. 1, as amended by Md. Laws
(1947) ch. 156.
18See, for example, Nicholas v. Martin, 128 N. J.Eq. 344, 15 A. 2d 235,
245 (1940), to the effect that penalty interest on New Jersey death taxes is
charged to income, not principal.
u" Me. Laws (1947) c. 220.
1
8 Me. Laws (1945) c. 269.
'0 There was an attempt to repeal the Massachusetts statute in 1945. Senate No. 412.
11Legislative Document No. 954 (1947).
"'Letter to the writer from Samuel H. Slosberg, Director of Legislative
Research, State of Maine, Oct. 22, 1948.
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According to one prominent attorney, who represented
a group of banks which handled estates, the act created
more difficulties than it solved. It was found that it would
be better for a testator to decide upon apportionment if
he wanted it rather than allow the statute to do it. Instead
of protecting against poor draftsmanship, it opened the road
to hardship in many cases. Other stated objections were
confusion, the expense of litigation, the prolongation of
administration of estates and the forcing of the executor
to become a litigant to collect the share of tax due from
these who received benefits which did not pass through
the executor's hands.
Furthermore, the act was not clear as to the method
of calculation to be followed. The Inheritance Tax Commissioner1 92 prepared sample computations based on three
different methods of apportioning the tax, and found that
there would be three different results. They furnish an
indication of complexity of the problem, in whatever state
it arises.
First Method
1. Deduct total federal tax from estate.
2. Determine tentative distributable shares.
3. Apportion federal tax in proportion to these tentative distributable shares.
4. Having deducted pro rata part of federal tax,
ascertain Maine tax.
5. Gross bequest, less taxes, equals net bequest.
Second Method
1. Determine gross distributable shares, reading the
will, as if the entire estate before taxes were
going to be distributed.
2. Apportion federal tax in proportion.
3. Deduct pro rata part of federal tax on each bequest.
4. Determine Maine tax on the difference.
5. Gross bequest, less taxes, equals net bequest.
"

At whose request I am informed the 1945 act was introduced.
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Third Method
1. Subtract federal tax from gross estate.
2. Split up the difference among the legatees according to the will.
3. Determine the Maine tax on the shares so ascertained.
4. Subtract Maine tax from each legacy.
5. Pro rate federal tax in proportion to differences
so ascertained.
6. Bequest, less taxes, equals net bequest.
The Tax Commissioner pointed out in his memorandum
that Sec. 27, c. 142, Maine Revised Stats., 1944, provides for
a prior deduction of federal estate taxes in computing state
death taxes. This indicated that the computation of the
Maine inheritance tax should follow a deduction of the
federal estate tax.
It is submitted that all of the variations set out by the
Tax Commissioner were valid interpretations of the statutory material with which he had to deal. It has been suggested that the problem could best be met either by statutory provision of a method of computation19 ' or by legislative authorization to an administrative official to select any
valid method.'9 4
Another objection voiced was the fact that possible
retroactivity to a case in which testator died before the
effective date of the statute (but in which case administration was pending on such effective date) would upset a
carefully drawn will. Questions of the applicability of the
tax in cases of annuities and of collection from out-of-state
1 There is partial reform in this direction in the 1948 amendment to the
Massachusetts statute. Mass. Laws (1948) c. 605, Sec. 1.
' Me. Laws (1947) c. 354, sec. 22, amending sec. 39E of c. 142, Me. Stats.,
changed the words "Inheritance tax commissioner" to "state tax assessor"
in the section providing for determination of amounts of apportionments
and prorations, etc. The writer suggested to the Director of Legislative
Research that since the rest of the law had been repealed, this amendment
might not be in order. Perhaps upon such suggestion, see. 39E was repealed
by c. 349, Laws of Maine, 1949. For actual computation in a New York
estate, see In re Dettmer's Will, 179 Misc. 844, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 99 (1943).
Compare the computation in In re Atwell's Estate, 85 Cal. App. 2d 454;
193 P. 2d 519 (1948).
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beneficiaries vexed the minds of many who considered the
problem.
It was pointed out that, while a man has an opportunity
to rewrite his will every time the statute changes to require
a rewriting, the average testator does not take the trouble.
Furthermore, as one bank counsel pointed out in a letter
to the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the 93rd
Legislature, smaller legacies would suffer disproportionately, as the tax rate on a large estate is high, and a pro
rata share would consume a particularly large portion of
a small bequest.' 9 ' It was pointed out that such small legacies are usually intended to be paid in full, but the act
denies such intention unless specifically expressed. 96
One attorney with considerable probate experience
pointed out that the volume of litigation in New York and
Pennsylvania was one indication of the confusion, expense
and delay attendant upon such legislation.
Although the force of these objections is not to be
denied, it may be that most of the difficulties can be alleviated by a combination of proper legislation and of understanding draftsmanship by him who is disposing of his
property. Maryland and Massachusetts have recently
amended their statutes to smooth the undesirable ruffles
from their apportionment schemes. 197 Maine, on the other
hand, chose to avoid the problems of statutory apportionment by abolishing the statute.
There are undoubtedly certain problems which do not
lend themselves readily to easy solution by testator, settlor
or legislature. Such is the problem of delay and expense
" In a New York case in which the net taxable estate was in excess of
three million dollars, a recipient of a ten thousand dollar legacy was made
to bear over three thousand of the approximately nine hundred fifty thousand dollar federal and state taxes. Legatee's argument against uniform
proration of graduated taxes among large and small legacies was denied.
The Court held tht moderation of the burden was legislative, and the
Surrogate could not, In the exercise of equitable power, apportion the taxes
in any manner other than that set out in the statute, In re Mollenhauer's
Will, 257 App. Div. 286, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 619 (1939).
16 It should be remembered, however, that an argument in favor of the
statute is that it keeps the residuary estate, which often is left to the
closest of kin, whom the testator intends to protect most, from bearing the
entire brunt of the tax.
'97Md. Laws (1947) c. 156; Mass. Laws (1948) c. 605.
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attendant upon the process of proration and litigation in
connection therewith.
Not only are estates kept unsettled prior to proration,
but proration, itself, may sometimes be delayed because
litigation concerning the tax liability is pending. In one
case, a petition by an unpaid pecuniary legatee for apportionment was denied even though five years had passed
since the death of the decedent, for a deficiency assessment
98
was still being litigated in the Tax Court."
In New York, proration can be delayed by failure of
the executor to pay the tax, for an executor cannot compel
payment by a beneficiary of a pro rata share of the tax
until such executor has paid the total tax due. 9 ' It should
be noted, however, that New York allows a fiduciary to
bring a proceeding to construe a will before he pays the
taxes, even though the statute reads that it is for proration
of taxes paid by the fiduciary and recovery of taxes paid
by the fiduciary on behalf of persons receiving taxable property from the estate."0
Under several of the statutes, distribution may be made
if sufficient bond is furnished.2"'
It cannot be denied that the attempted solutions of the
problem have created a more complex situation than might
have been anticipated.
While the Virginia statute is relatively new, it is expected, according to the State Tax Commissioner, to raise
more questions than it settled. 20 2 On the other hand, it may
be that little difficulty will be encountered in the lesspopulous states. There has apparently been no litigation
over this subject in New Hampshire as late as January,
1949.203

Additional criticism comes from Connecticut, which has
begun to experience administrative difficulties in connec"ICardeza's

Estate, 51 Pa. D. & C. 461 (Orphans Ct., Phila. Co. 1943).
I11nre Williams' Estate, 189 Misc. 210, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 840 (1947) ; In
re Graham's Estate. 49 N. Y. S. 2d 508 (1944).
N In re Bull's Estate, 175 Misc. 197, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 5 (1940).
For example, Va. Code, Sec. 5440-b(4) ; Pa. Stats. (1941) Tit. 20, sec.
844; see In re Hansen's Estate, 344 Pa. 12, 23 A. 2d 886 (1942).
1 Letter to the writer, Feb. 7, 1949.
10Letter to the writer from Assistant Attorney General of New Hampshire, Feb. 9, 1949.
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tion with its statute. According to the Clerk of the Hartford Probate Court, who has had much experience with the
Connecticut proration act, the fact that proration is mandatory makes the procedure "relatively expensive and complicated" in the case of many estates."°4 Furthermore, the
prescribed mechanics of computation would indicate that
the federal tax must be finally prorated before the Connecticut succession tax is computed. This, however, is difficult, since the state tax return is due twelve months after
death and payment thereof fourteen months after death,
while the federal tax return is not finally fixed and audited
until long thereafter.2 0 5 In practice, estimates must be
utilized.
Mr. Locke finds the Sheffield formula for proration "
far too simplified, and suggests the following steps:
"1. An allocation of the gross taxable estate between
the beneficiaries liable for proration.
"2. An allocation of the deductions between them.
"3. An allocation of the net taxable estate by subtracting the results in the second step from those in
the first.
"4. Apportion the gross basic and additional tax.
"5. Apportion the [80%] credit for the succession tax
between the various beneficiaries in the same proportions in which they bore the burden of the succession tax.
"6. Show the proration of the total federal estate tax
payable for subtracting the results in step 5 from
those in step 4. 207
The Sheffield formula, which Mr. Locke regards as far
too simplified, is basically that, if
A equals the "value of property for any recipient as
found in the estate tax return ... before legatee's exemption, if any"; and
Locke, Administrative Difl~culties in the Prorationof the FederalEstate
Tam2, 21 Conn. B. J. 168 (1947).
Ibid., 169.
Notes on Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Taes-A Considerationof the New York Statute, 19 Conn. B. J. 6, 9 (1945).
I" Locke, supra,n. 204, 1714.
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B equals the "net estate for federal tax, before the exemptions and taxes, but after administration expense and
debt deductions", and
C equals the "total estate tax payable", then C times A
divided by B equals the "tax payable by the recipient of
A,.

20 8

The problem of computation is not examined here beyond the illustrations above set out to indicate its complicating effect upon proration. 2 9 The problem is not inherent
in statutory apportionment. It arises generally, whenever
two taxes must be calculated at one time and their amounts
are inter-related.1 °
Certainly there are difficulties attendant upon the effectuation of a scheme of statutory apportionment. However,
if there is sufficient need for the statute, a satisfactory
statute can be drawn. Gradual amendment in the light of
litigation in other states and of the developing need at home
can be combined with studied resolution of anticipated
problems. If it be that the exemption from procedure under
proration granted to banks holding joint bank accounts in
the 1948 Massachusetts amendment 21 ' results in a less
equitable apportionment than was intended, another state
need not copy it, and Massachusetts could abandon it. However, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire provisions as
to life insurance proceeds '1 2 undoubtedly merit investigation and perhaps copying. There can be little doubt about
the desirability of settling the problem of penalty and interest on delayed payments by statutory provision,2 1 and
much could be accomplished by legislative direction as
to the method of computation in complex tax cases. Surely,
the novel features of the 1947 Maryland statute for the proSheffield, 8upra, n. 206, 9.
2 At this writing (March 1949) there is pending before the Connecticut
legislature a bill to simplify procedure for proration of federal and Connecticut estate taxes. H. 504.
..0 See, for example of problematic computation in one estate of Wisconsin
normal inheritance tax. Wisconsin estate tax, Illinois and Florida inheritance taxes and Wisconsin emergency tax, In re Miller's Estate, 254 Wisc.
24, 35 N. W. 2d 404, 406 (1948). See also Schonberger, How to Compute
Multiple Interdependent State and Federal Taxe8, 27 Taxes 258 (1949).
211Mass. Acts (1948) c. 605, sec. 2.
m
Supra,n. 163.
'sCirca, n. 46.
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tection of the surviving spouse 14.must be recognized as a
great advance in eliminating one of the harshest results of
such remedial legislation as is herein treated. If the need
for equitable apportionment by statute exists, certainly a
satisfactory statute can be drawn to accomplish the purpose.
If the states in which statutory apportionment has been
adopted will not alter the early pattern of looking to the
domicile of the decedent at death in settling questions of
conflict of laws, there will be little need for a uniform
statute. True it is that there will be varying patterns of
tax incidence in different estates, dependent upon the domicile of the decedent at death, but, to the extent that the
decedent disposes of his property in the light of the laws of
his domicile, such variations can be regarded as but varying desires and directions of the particular testators or setlors.21 5
Legislatures and courts should take particular care to
allow the desires and intent of the testator (or settlor, as
the case may be) to be carried out. Such consideration
is a vital incident to the right to dispose of one's own
property according to his will. It is only fitting that tax
legislation, which has played such havoc with the property
and the will of decedents, be remedied, in order that the
most equitable result may ultimately be achieved.
"S Supra, n. 51.

," The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
apparently not considered a uniform state statute to apportion the incidence
of the federal estate tax.

